Consultation Form Annex B * Complete as appropriate

CONSULTATION TEMPLATE

LABSS TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION /

ALTERNATIVE DESIGN APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE

CONSULTATION PROCESS FOR USE WITH LABSS CONSORTIA GROUPS;

BSD TECHNICAL and PROCEDURAL GROUP AND WITH SFRS (IF APPROPRIATE)

STAGE 1 MAKING THE CASE		
Regulation 9 **Provisions on which a determination is sought** **Guidance Clause reference and relevance**	**Recommended Decision** **Describe applicant's/complainant's case**	**Reason for Recommended Decision** ***alternative compliance recommendations read with site specific conditions where appropriate
Mandatory Standard 2.9 Every building must be designed and constructed in such a way that in the event of an outbreak of fire within the building, the occupants, once alerted to the outbreak of the fire, are provided with the opportunity to escape from the building, before being affected by fire or smoke.	**Applicant's Case** *2.9.10 Table 2.4 - Escape Route Options for flats and maisonettes for a building greater than 7.5m but not more than 60m with 2 escape routes and figure 2.5.* *Under the guidance in table 2.4 It is our interpretation that where there are 2 escape routes on an upper floor the 30m max corridor does not*	The current dispute resolution process has an option for consultation with the BSD at local level and recognising aspects of what the applicant is saying regarding the way the guidance is presented we contacted the BSD.

2.9.10 Escape routes - options Table 2.4 Escape routes (flats, maisonettes and ancillary rooms and spaces) In the case of a building containing flatted dwellings with at least 2 escape routes Table 2.4 provides the following (irrespective of height) At least 2 escape routes, and: . not more than 30m travel distance in **protected corridor** 2.9.14 Escape routes – smoke ventilation Although there are physical barriers to fire such as walls, floors and doors, there is still a risk of smoke spread into escape routes. Therefore, **smoke ventilation should be provided in** protected lobbies, fire-fighting lobbies and **protected corridors** to help maintain tenable conditions within escape routes. Referring to Figure 2.5 The diagram indicates a corridor with a short duration self-closing fire door (approx. centrally located) and a distance depicted as 30m max from that door to an escape stair.	*require to be ventilated. Ventilation would only be required where there is one escape route or a dead end situation exists. Clauses 2.9.14 – 2.9.16 we believe would only apply where table 2.4 calls for smoke ventilation to be provided.* *It is our belief that both table 2.4 and Figure 2.5 depict our exact interpretation of the guidance and clearly defines where smoke ventilation is and is not required. Clauses 2.9.14 to 2.9.16 provide guidance of how to achieve compliant smoke ventilation, when it is required under table 2.4 and Fig 2.5.* **Decision** The protected corridor should be provided with smoke ventilation in accordance with the recommendations in 2.9.14. The diagram in Figure 2.5 Upper Floor – Two Escape Routes is indicative only and is referred to in the additional information below Table 2.4 for guidance on measurement of travel distance. It does not provide all of the relevant information contained within the relevant guidance clauses in relation to a layout which has 2 escape routes.	They confirmed that the corridors should have manually opening ventilation and have a cross corridor FD30S door - although reference to a cross corridor door is also not in the text or tables but is in the diagram.

Whilst not shown on the diagram, and with reference to Table 2.4 and 2.9.14, the corridor should be described as a **protected corridor** and should therefore be provided with smoke ventilation in accordance with the recommendations in 2.9.14.		

STAGE 2 - CONSULTATION WITH 7 CONSORTIA	
Comments sought from Other Consortium to allow the LABSS Position to be determined	
*This area to be completed by each Consortium Lead / Technical Lead (include all comments from other consortia)	
Group 1: Southwest Scotland Building Standards Consortium (SWSBSC)	
Group 2: Highlands and Islands consortium (H&IC)	
Group 3: Southeast Scotland Building Standards Consortium (SESBSC)	
Group 4: Tayside consortium (TC)	
Group 5: Clyde Valley consortium (CVC)	**Renfrewshire** I would agree that the text is not clear and why the applicant is pursuing this. But the intent within the regulation is clear and I would agree with the BSD's point of view. **East Dunbartonshire** EDC have discussed this query and agree with the Glasgow City council response. Whilst the guidance in relation to table 2.4 and diagram 2.5 may suggest the desired approach will be acceptable Section 2.9.14 clearly reiterates the correct approach. A fire occurring in one of the dwellings, where the smoke enters the circulation area, will have the potential to trap a significant number of persons within their homes where no smoke control is available. This situation also causes delay and problems for the fire service when dealing with these types of incidents.

	East Renfrewshire East Renfrewshire agree that smoke extraction will be required. **West Dunbartonshire** The guidance in Section 2.9.10 table 2.4 for two escape routes references a protected corridor. A protected corridor requires ventilation under 2.9.14. Therefore I agree with Glasgow's interpretation. **Inverclyde** Irrespective of the height of the building the corridor between the escape stairs requires to be a protected corridor. 2.9.14 and 2.14 both state that protected corridors should be provided with smoke ventilation to maintain tenable conditions**.** **Argyll and Bute** I can see where the applicant is coming from if you just refer to Table 2.4 however in 2.19.4 it states that smoke ventilation should be provided to protected corridors, as we know the Technical Handbook derives from British Standards, I have attached an extracts from BS5588. I would say that the BS confirms that smoke ventilation of the corridors is required.
Group 6: Central Authorities consortium (CAC)	
Group 7: Grampian consortium (GC)	

STAGE 3 – LABSS POSITION FOLOWING CONSULTATION WITH 7 CONSORTIA
*This area to be completed by LABSS Management / CTWG
LABSS Position following Feedback
LABSS notes the unanimous opinion from the Clyde Valley Consortium. Therefore no further consortia consultation is required. The technical position is summarized in the Stage 5 Final Decision.

STAGE 4 - CONSULTATION REVIEW WITH BSD and SFRS
Comments sought from BSD Technical/Procedural group
*This area to be completed by LABSS in association with BSD
Comment from the BSD was sought by the instigating Authority. The BSD confirmed that the corridors should have manually opening ventilation and have a cross corridor FD30S door.
Comments sought from SFRS (if appropriate)
This area to be completed by LABSS in association with SFRS
Given that the final decision is in line with the Technical Handbooks, no consultation with SFRS is deemed necessary.

STAGE 5 - CONSULTATION REVIEW FINAL DECISION
Final Decision
This area to be completed by LABSS in association with BSD This will be confirmed: • by LABSS and added to the LABSS Website, and • by BSD Standard Decision Letter (if appropriate)
The LABSS Final Decision in this case is that a protected corridor should be provided with smoke ventilation in accordance with the recommendations in 2.9.14. The diagram in Figure 2.5 'Upper Floor – Two Escape Routes' should be considered only for the purpose of providing guidance on the measurement of travel distance and should not be regarded as detailing all of the relevant requirements contained within other sections of the guidance clauses in relation to a layout which has 2 escape routes.